Kantinomus Verlag

Marcel Chelba

Kant – The Modern!

– 30 philosophical conjectures[1] –

Abstract: This paper is not intended to prove anything, but just to state some findings more or less relevant to the exegesis of Kant’s philosophy. The central thesis is that modern science brought Kant the ultimate confirmation, not refutation. These 30 philosophical conjectures are actually the main ideas of my book: Critical Introduction. About the possibility of Metaphysics, as Science, in the critical philosophy of Kant (2004), not yet translated from romanian language.

 

1. No matterhow it willbe(monadic, pentadicordodecahedric) oursystems of categoryes are nothing morethan just some systems of coordinates –some transformation matrices – somecodesof interpretation that translatedata of our sensuous experienceinto the terms ofour facultyof representation.
2. Modern physicsworkswith ahiddenreality(as «thing in itself», in Kant’s philosophy), notexplicit(as inNewtonianmechanics). The epistemological perspectiveofmodern science is that ofKant’stranscendentalaesthetics.
3. Kant’s TranscendentalAestheticis actually ahermeneutics ofempiricalexperience. «Sensibility» isour facultyto recognizethe «a prioriforms»ofourproductiveimaginationinto the data received from our sense organs.
4. Modern physics does not make the inventory ofnature (does not drawmapsthat tendto substitutereality, asFritjofCapranoticedin”TheTaoof Physics”), but it knowsfrom the beginningthat it can approach its objects of studyonlyin aprobabilisticandrelativisticmanner. Modern physics is no more an exact sciencein the classical senseof the term, because it is certainonly on itsuncertainties. Modern physicsis rather ahermeneutics ofempiricalexperiencethananobjective descriptionof reality.Thatsaidtheir way,Heisenberg, withhis famousuncertaintyprinciple, andEinstein,withhis famousepistemologicalparadox: „As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality”[2] . Indeed, as also said Niels Bohr, „It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out about natur Physics concerns what we can say about nature”[3]. Regarding that insurmountable precipice between our mathematical models and physical reality, Bohr and Einstein were in agreement.
5. ForKant, modern sciencebeganwithGalileo–withhis way of forcing natureto answer certain questions in the course of Hence,from Galileoonwards,the newontologicalandepistemologicalproblemof philosophy is no longer receptivity, but consistency ofour criteriaof truthin the interpretationof responses given by nature.(In the eyes of Galileo, Saturnseemed to havetwo satellites. Observationwas correct,somethinggravitatearound Saturn, but the interpretationwas stillwrong.) „The bookofnatureiswritteninthelanguageofmathematics”, saidGalileo, in Il Saggiatore (1683) – but any act of reading is an act of interpretation, and any act of interpretation is an act of treason, will try to say Kant, in his own way. Nothing is as it seems at first glance (reading). «Tradutore, traditore!» – it was the great scholastic adage of the Middle Ages. «Things are not as they are, but how we see them» – say Mihai Eminescu in Archaeus (a romanticized interpretation of Kant’s philosophy into the key of absolute idealism suggested by Jacobi).
6. Transcendental illusionis the veilofMaya. The awareness on this confusion(amphibolies, orsubreption, as Kant says), that we doalwaysbetweenobject andconcept,betweensignand meaningor between «phenomenon»and «thing in itself»,itis, said Eminescu, «the donkeysbridge» – «pons asinorum» of philosophy(as it was consideredthe Pythagorean theorem by scholars). Indeed, scientificexperimentis not an innocent and heavenlyact ofcontemplation, but a genuineinterrogation – ourbrutalwayto forcenatureto come intoour «synthetica prioriconcepts»as in aslipperof theCinderella. Inmodern physicsthe act ofmeasurementis nota simple act ofobservationof nature,but arudeinterferenceintoher personallife. Inmodern physicsthe so-calledlaws of natureno longer regardnature,butour relationshipwith it. Scientific theoriesare no longersome simple police reports but someindictments. Science isour way ofcontaminatingnaturewith our ownheuristical preconceptions. Technologyisour waytoplagiarize
7. Advancement of knowledge depends not somuch on increasingthe resolutionofour telescopesandmicroscopes as of the finess increasement of our conceptual grid of interpretation. Indeed, «without sensuos intuitions ourconceptsare void, but without concepts our sensuos intuitionsareblind», saysKant[4]. Without a priori principles, our empirical knowledge would be a simple groping (ein blosses Herumtappen) – a bunch of experimental data for any generalization would not be Therefore, after a courageous investigation of our criteria of truth, Kant also had to proceed to a severe examination of our moral criteria. For without moral in Kant’s view, man is nothing but a «crooked wood» (krummen Holz). Morality is our only original contribution in the economy of nature – is the attitude that brings us irreversibly out of animal kingdom. Morality in Kant, is another instinct – a kind of survival instinct turned inside out, which does not concern our selfish interests (personal or of group), but our universal interests. We are truly free only in our moral acts – he means Kant. The moral is the historical determined expression of causality through freedom. Only in his moral acts man proves his divine ancestry. Man is not truly free when does what he thinks he’s free to do, but only when he chooses to do only what reason tells him that anyone can do without damage the freedom of others. Do not confuse, however, «free will» with «causality through freedom». To be free is not to choose a path between some predefined paths, but to be a pioneer (an opener of new paths). Only by moral man become really a determinant factor in history – the original beginning, demiurgical one, of a new causal chain in nature. This is the great ontological stake of the famous classical urge: sapere aude!
8. Allolder theoriescan be found, in one wayoranother,in the latest. Noveltyorprogress of ascientific theoryshould notnecessarily lead tocassationof theearlier(in the spirit of Occam), but,in theovercomingthat it represents(in the spirit of Dilthey, WindelbandorKuhn), the new theoriesmustresemnifice the old ones – they haveto revealtheir limits(their domain of validity) andwear themtoa broaderknowledge– in short,must findtheir place in the landscape of scientific knowledge. Allphilosophiesare true–not false ormeaningless, asanalysts say. Newerphilosophiesarenotsuperior to theolderonly ifthey manageto make them more intelligible, ie to reconstructtheminsome wider and more consistent contexts of ideas.
9. Fundamental interestof philosophyis thediscovery of the truth, notits public approval. ForKant, criticism is a form of respect, not ideological struggle. The precedentmost notoriousof this ideaisright in the majestic introductionof Kantinhis onsetbook[5] (1746), where he said that in our relationship with tradition only our chastening (tadeln) attitude represents our true sign of respect for (Kant was still in precritical period. The word «Kritik» has not yet entered in his philosophical vocabulary.)
10. Kantis interested inontology ofknowledge,notthe psychology andsociology of knowledge. Metaphysics, inits historicaldevelopment, is nothing more thanthe originalmatrixand at the sametime,the Cardinal – the upper limit ofscientific knowledge.Metaphysicsis the Queen – italways makesthe step forward – sciencedoesnothing but coming on its footstepsandusurp its privileges,relying on some empirical evidence, but sayingessentiallythe same thing, as did Aristotle (the vainandungratefuldisciple)to Plato.Has neverbeenmore obviousthat rapt of scienceon themetaphysicsastoday, whenmoderncosmologydoes nothing more thanreiterate, inother words,the oldcreationistmyths.
11. Philosophiesintheir historicalsequence, as far asthey represent aprogressofphilosophical knowledge, they are nothing but some Prolegomena or Propaedeutics to thepreviousphilosophies(some introductionsto otherintroductions). Kantisan introduction toHegelisan introduction toHeraclitus. Heidegger isan introduction toKant etc.
12. The great tradition ofphilosophical thinkingis a kind of alpine ascension on a immutable itinerary of questions that anyonecan enterandperformat any timein history,without relying onthe help ofan initiate(asMenonhas depended onthe questionsof Socrates) or on the assimilationof tradition, as professed the Scholastics.
13. Kant’stranscendentalidealismas architectural visionon thought is a system ofreconcilingour fundamentalperspectivesof knowledge.
14. Inhis critical solutionto the problem ofcosmologicalantinomiesKantinaugurated thenewepistemological paradigmofmodern science – the dualisticandrelativisticvisionona reality forever hidden, whichcreatesitself even in theact of knowing. Withthis, Kantconnected Western analytical thinking not only to the oldplatonictradition, butby default, to the greatEasternphilosophical tradition.
15. Non-Euclideangeometries, theorems of Gödel, epistemologicalviewofthe Copenhagen School, Heisenberg’suncertainty principleandEinstein’srelativisticphysicsbroughtKant theultimateconfirmation.
16. In theconcept of «thingin itself»(asGegenstand) Kant hasthe intuitionof a generic «obstacle», a generic «ontological surprise», ie an ontologicalprecariousnessof our instruments of knowledge. ButKantdid notaccuseGodof this «ontological disability», as did Descartes. Guilty, inKant’s view, is our own «analytical thinking», our inabilityto get outfrom the tutelage ofour sensitive insights and the fearto thinkwith our own
17. The so-calledempirical knowledgeof natureis actuallya deconstruction ofour transcendental certainties, ie a recurrent(retrospective) knowledge of a mysterious external presence. In other words, experience occasionsratherknowingwhatwe do not know than what we know with certainty.
18. Fundamental epistemological problem of Kant is not the revelation of truth, but the recognition of truth – erkennen, not kennen – how can we realize that something is true or false.
19. Criticalmethod(which Kanthadalso called «Socratic method»[6]), apophatic method of theology, phenomenological reduction method of Husserl, and sofianic method of Lucian Blaga, are essentially expressions of one and the same epistemological paradigm.
20. Kant’s man is Cheselden’s blind – the patient who felt cheated when he saw the light for the first time (at age 13), and he did not know what tricks him: senses, or the sight. This illustrious pathological case was for Kant a real «experimentum crucis» (as were for modern physics the experiences of Kirchhoff and Planck or Michelson and Morley).
21. Analytic-synthetic distinctionof Kantrevealed the existence of two fundamentalperspectivesof thought: the mole’s perspective and the bird’s perspective, as I like to say – the realistic, empiricist or naturalistic perspective (based on the consistency criterion), and the perspective of transcendental idealism (based on the completeness criterion). Kant’s great contribution is that he managed to reconcile these two perspectives of thought, ie, take them out of their traditional antagonism and put them in a complementary relationship. Kant’s entire philosophical view is biased by a judicial paradigm – everything to Kant, is a process which aims at establishing a lasting (eternal) peace between these two enemy camps.
22. Epistemological paradigmof quantum mechanics(summarized in the well-knownwitticism: «Contraria non contradictoria sed complementa sunt») is nothing more than a reiteration of Kant’s solution to antinomy of pure reason. Recognizing that ignorance of reason regarding the «transcendent», and the withdrawal of its competencies on the territory of the «transcendental» are the epistemological matrix of probabilistic interpretation in quantum mechanics.
23. The dilemmaof Kantian system of metaphysics(revealed by Jacobi) is similar tothe Gödel’s dilemma, concerning theconsistencyand completeness oflogical and mathematicalsystems. Difference isthat ifthe positive sciencesopting for the theoreticalconsistencyof theirmainframe systems(fundamental feature ofthe dogmaticrationalism, Kantwould say), philosophygenerallyopt forthe completeness ofitssystemof ideas– hence theparadoxism ofphilosophy.
24. «Thing in itself» (as «Gegenstand»), Gödel could say, is a sentence that says of itself that it is undemonstrable. «Thing in itself» is a sentence that can be asserted in the system, but can not be deduced from the axioms of the system – it can be inserted or removed from the system of metaphysics only in the axiomatic manner – just as the vanishing point (the meeting place of parallels, in the laws of perspective) is excluded from Euclidean geometry and included in non-Euclidean geometries.
25. „On the other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation. Now the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable by this reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to enable us to raise a question – faculty or materials failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.”[7] In this phrase Kant has done nothing but formulate the incompleteness principle of metaphysics.
26. Jacobi’s remark suchthat “Without theconditionof thingsin themselvesyoucannot getintothe kantiansystem,withityoucannotstayinit” is nothing butanearlyformulationof the famous undecidability theorem of Gödel,which couldbe formulatedas: without «thing in itself»metaphysicalsystemis incomplete, but with the «thing in itself» it is (seems to be) inconsistent. Kanthas revealedfor the first timethatin a logical system completenessand consistencyaretwoorthogonaldimensions. In fact, the system of metaphysics is aparaconsistentlogic(in thetermsof daCosta) or a supercompact logic, such as ZFC-extended (in thetermsofPeterKoellner, HarvardUniversity). «Thing in itself»is astrange characterwho, likeEpimenides (the Cretan)says: “All Cretansare liars”, or, asGödel,writeson the blackboardthe sentence”This sentence isundemonstrable” and thenasks ifitisdemonstrableor not. To becomplete, metaphysics must postulatethe transcendent(the «thing in itself», the «world», «God»), but to remainconsistent,it mustevictthe subject of suchsynthetica prioriconceptsfromitsontologicalremit. That’s whatmade​​ Metaphysics must beabletoask questionsthatthey can notanswer – justto beabletodetermineits ownlimits. You can builda wallon the edgeof a cliff, but how to puta foundation stoneat the edge ofthe world?The transcendentis a kind of cantilever scaffold which reasonbuildsover the Nothingness, justto be able torise above «mundus intelligibilis», into a complete(global) vision. The Transcendentisthe wayof reasonto objectivate for itselfthe Nothingness.
27. Fundamental dilemma of Kantian transcendental philosophy, namely, if the «thing in itself» is something or nothing, is congruent with the dilemma of modern physicists, mathematicians and logicians: if infinite physically exist, if the primordial vacuum is still something, or if the cardinal of a set is or is not an element of the set.
28. Positivesciences, as theyapproach the «greatunification»(a global vision of Nature), they do nothing butto approach theMetaphysics, its dialectical, paradoxical, ubiquitousandindiscernible vision. Science of Metaphysics, just as Kantimagined, do not aspire toa different kind ofknowledge ofnature, but to the a priori modelof anypossibleknowledge. The object ofsciencesisalwaysoutside of them. The object of MetaphysicsisalwaysMetaphysics,inKant’s view, is the scienceof its own possibility. Last chance of Metaphysics,inKant’s view, wasto becomeatranscendentallogic. Transcendentallogicis not an emasculated logic, deprivedof its ontological prerogatives (as Heideggerwould notice), but a metaphysic welltemperateby its ownskepticism – by its own «System der Vorsicht»[8], as Kant says. Transcendental logic is the logic of those who have passed the «donkeys bridge» in philosophy.
29. The relationship between the Kantian transcendentalidealism and the empiricist realismof the Aristotelian traditionis reproduced both in the relationship between Euclideanand noneuclidiane geometryes,as well asin therelationship betweenrelativisticandNewtonianphysics.
30. Modernfoundationalresearchesdid no morethanreiterate the dilemmas and conclusions ofKantinhis researchon thefoundationsof metaphysics. After a half-century sincethe appearance ofCritique of Pure Reason, a Copernican revolutiontook place ingeometry:Lobacevski, GaussandBoliaybroughtthe infinity(the transcendent) in geometry. After another half-century the leaders ofquantum mechanicsand of relativityhavedone the same thingin physics. A fewdecades agobegana Copernican revolutioninformal logic. But manyother sciencesare workingfurtherunder the empireof «transcendentalillusion»– theyare stillto «puberty» – have not yetreached the big self-referential questions (regarding their ownconsistency)andstillbelieve, asAristotleorCheselden’s blind(before he opend his eyes) that sensesdo not lie.

 

 

[1] Fragment of a letter sent by email to Constantin Aslam, 21 January 2009, revised and translated into English on 1 September 2014. This text (English version) was sent to the 12th International Kant Congress “Nature and Freedom” (Vienna 2015) but has not been approved by Congress committee.

[2]  A. Einstein, Sidelights on Relativity, London, 1922, p. 28 – apud M. Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, p. 56.

[3] Apud Nick Herbert, in Quantum Reality, Anchor Press/Doubleday, New York, 1985, p. 259.

[4] KPR, A 51, B 75.

[5] “Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung…“ A VI.

 

[6] KRV, B XXXII.

[7] „In der Erklärung der Erscheinungen der Natur muss uns indessen vieles ungewiss und manche Frage unauflöslich bleiben, weil das, was wir von der Natur wissen, zu dem, was wir erklären sollen, bei weitem nicht in allen Fällen zureichend ist. Es fragt sich nun: ob in der Transzendentalphilosophie irgend eine Frage, die ein der Vernunft vorgelegtes Objekt betrifft, durch eben diese reine Vernunft unbeantwortlich sei, und ob man sich ihrer entscheidenden Beantwortung dadurch mit Recht entziehen könne, dass man es als schlechthin ungewiss (aus allem dem, was wir erkennen können) demjenigen beizählt, wovon wir zwar so viel Begriff haben, um eine Frage aufzuwerfen, es uns aber gänzlich an Mitteln oder am Vermögen fehlt, sie jemals zu beantworten.“ CPR, A 477, B 505.

[8] CPR, A 711, B 739.