Marcel Chelba – Some physiological evidence for Kantian epistemological apriorism (PDF)

Abstract submitted to the International Conference at the University of Siegen

Digitales Kant-Zentrum NRW: Opening Workshop

30 September — 1 October, 2022

Kantinomus Verlag, Tübingen, 2023

ISBN: 978-3-9820930-2-4

© Marcello-Silvestri Chelba, 2023

PDF, 3 pages A4, 1,99 Euro

Reading sample:

”Kant tried to illustrate his ideas with the scientific material available to him in his time, but the ideas he illustrated have become even more prominent in modern science.

In answering the first question of metaphysics (“Was kann ich wissen?”) Kant did not set out to metaphysically ground Newton’s mechanics or Euclid’s geometry, only their epistemology. The Critique of Pure Reason was basically a new Discourse on the Method – a heroic attempt to provide a metaphysical foundation for knowledge in general, i.e. to synthesize a new criterion of truth, so high and comprehensive that even metaphysics could legitimize itself as a science through it. This was the goal. Whoever overlooks it can see in the Critique of Pure Reason nothing but a revolting tangle of contradictions (as it seemed to Jacobi).

Kant’s critics took a wrong turn from the start, because they applied to Kantian philosophical discourse precisely that criterion of truth which Kant had gone beyond. They were guided by the formal criterion of logical consistency (the principle of the excluded third), whereas Kant was guided by the ontological criterion of completeness (the principle of the synthetic unity of aperception), which regarded contradiction as a logical necessity and introduced it into the system as a complementary, not contradictory, component. However, according to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems…”

Marcel Chelba – Some Physiological Evidence for Kantian Epistemological Apriorism, Kantinomus, 2023